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Abstract
It is said that nothing in this world is certain except for death and taxes. For those with clever accountants,
however, the latter can be kept to a minimum. Particularly, companies seek to minimize their tax liability
through "tax planning", adopting deductions, rebates, exemptions and other “legal” tools that the domestic
tax system provides to them. However, while tax planning is considered to be quite logical in the terms of
making profit, there is a grey area between this and "tax avoidance”. This paper suggests a legitimate tax
plan for a multinational technology company that minimizes its tax obligations1, without being inconsistent
with the policies of Corporate Social Responsibility1 (CSR) and the desire for profit maximization by the
shareholders. As such, it is proposed that a multinational company should exploit tax havens’ opportunity to
relocate the Intellectual Property (IP) ownership but ensuring, in the same time, that it shares its gross profit
between the tax haven and the source country paying 13% of the gross profit to the relevant resident.
Keywords: Tax Plan, Tax Haven, Offshore, Intellectual Property, Corporate Social Responsibility.
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Introduction
The most visible effect of globalization is the increasing number of companies that develop international
activities. To access foreign markets, firms face several dilemmas, as whether to relocate production abroad,
which are basically influenced by tax factors (Barrios, et al., 2008). Therefore, multinational technology
companies have to construct a legitimate tax plan, embedded with the latest updates, to minimize the tax
obligations. The general perception is that taxation is purely a national affair, but in reality there is a
longstanding tradition of international tax cooperation, which has become firmly institutionalized over time
and has gained some degree of autonomy, influencing over national tax policies (Rixen, 2010, pp.1).
The creation of a tax plan for a multinational technology company is not a simple process as long as it
requires compatibility between the national tax systems of the countries the company operates. Otherwise,
the consequences are serious enough to create administrative inefficiencies, extra costs as well as to become
a basis for unethical actions (Prebble, 1997). The position is a lot of exigent when it comes in respect of
business profits due to complex set of jurisdictions interacting with one another. However, unlike the “soft
law” mode of governance, the international tax system has a significant impact on binding national tax rules
and bilateral double tax treaties (Rixen, 2009).
The international tax governance faces a lot of challenges, mainly by the fact that countries prefer to defend
their domestic tax systems over the international ones in the bilateral and multilateral agreements. This
comes as a consequence of the irrational political desire to avoid double taxation1 situations while, in the
same time, to gain taxable revenues. Indeed, national tax autonomy causes harmful tax competition2 and a
“race to the bottom” (Baskaran and Lopes, 2013). As result, the international multilevel governance tax
system serves as the final recipient of all the cases which require tax arbitration or derive from harmful tax
competition (Rixen, 2009).
As such, technology companies have to exploit any tax opportunities to minimize taxes, as the one referred
by Warpole (2001), who presented a special treatment of intangible assets by relocating them to tax havens.

1

Double taxation represents taxing the same taxable matter, for the same period of time, by two different fiscal authorities,
belonging either to the same state or to different ones (Dudas, 2011).
2
Harmful effects may occur when one country's tax policies influence either the policy decisions of another country or the
location decisions of financial services and other highly mobile activities (Weiner and Ault, 1998).
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The aim of this paper is to introduce a legitimate and ethical tax plan focused on Multinational Technology
companies, which will minimize tax obligations.

History
When the transfer pricing3 regulations were introduced in 2001, this subject was completely unknown.
During the next decade, the transfer pricing has become an important international taxation issue for both
tax administrations and taxpayers (Gupta, 2009). Many companies have benefited by transferring prices
between different countries.
According to the Telegraph, Starbucks’ US operation charged high prices to its UK operation for various
services, such as royalties for the use of branding or for management services, or lent money to its UK
operation at high interest rates (Ebrahimi, 2012). Consequently, Starbucks’ profits rose in the USA and fell
in the UK; as illustrated in Appendix 1.

Current state
From Antigua in the Caribbean to Nauru in the South Pacific, offshore4 tax havens leach billions of dollars
every year in tax revenues from countries around the world (N.Y., 2001). As the US Internal Revenue
Service reported, the Caribbean tax havens alone drain away at least $70 billion a year in personal income
tax revenue.
According to Bloomberg, multinational technology companies as Google and Amazon have received strict
criticism for their strategy to send billions of dollars of profits abroad. For example, Google sells almost all
ads in Europe through its Irish subsidiary, leaving little tax revenue in other countries, but in which
customers’ reside. The Irish subsidiary in turn pays royalties to a second Irish subsidiary, but which is based
in Bermuda. Last year, Google sent nearly $12 billion in Bermuda reducing by more than $2 billion global
tax burden borne. At the same time, Google’s subsidiary in Italy income tax paid just $1.8 million.
However, many governments all over the world make efforts to eliminate the tax breaks that lure foreign
capital. Recently, as Reuters referred, the Italian parliament introduced the “Google tax” which refers on the
3

Transfer pricing is an important instrument for managing the global tax liability of multinationals (Durr and Gox, 2013).

4

Work done for a company by people in another country that it typically done at a much cheaper cost.
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internet advertising and will start on July 2014 (Mackenzie, 2013). Under the new measure, the Italian
multinationals companies are obliged to buy their ads on Internet only by companies which have their
headquarters in Italy and not, as happened till now, by partnerships located in "tax havens" such as Ireland,
Luxembourg and Bermuda.

Environmental statement
Nowadays, the multinational companies have expanded their activities, via technology, in every place of the
world. However, that extension of corporate areas is also related to the notion of Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR), which suggests that multinational corporations should address social issues, such as
overcoming poverty, enhancing employees’ well-being, and improving the welfare of society (Kim and
Choi, 2012).
Even though many companies have expressed their ethical and responsible conduct in respect of the social
environment, there were many cases when the business practices were not aligned with the declared
corporate behavior (Dumitru, 2012). For example, important companies from Romania that have a clear
CSR policy have decided to apply Tax Avoidance Practices5 (TAP), in order to avoid some of the domestic
taxes (Dumitru, 2012, pp. 1085). Consequently, CSR hypocrisy is very common through profit motivated
companies since, even in companies’ reports, they avoid to admit that operating abroad may result in less tax
to be paid in the domestic countries (Obiri, 2011).

Discussion of the facts and issues
The Intellectual Property (IP)
For most economists, the intellectual capital is considered as one of the main competitive advantages. The
reasons of such tendency are related to the fact that intellectual capital is a major factor, mostly in the
growth of the multinational companies fear value, which does not appear in the accounting system (Derun,
2013). Multinational technology firms can strategically patent Intellectual Capital to effectively protect

5

Tax avoidance is a practice of using legal means to pay the least amount of tax possible.
www.thinkingfinance.info

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3254816

valuable technological assets. The patented Intellectual Capital is known as Intellectual Property6 (IP)
(Wiederhold, 2011).
However, recent challenges and attention to IP tax planning has prompted governments around the world to
consider new tax measures that affect all phases of IP development and business (Sang et al., 2013).
Consequently, this results in IP migrating from one tax jurisdiction to another lower tax jurisdiction to
realize maximum corporate profits.

Assumptions
It is required to make some assumptions in order to provide a legitimate tax plan. As such, the technology
company is a large Multinational Corporation that was incorporated in Greece in 2007; it has a presence in
UK and has global customers. Additionally, the company has a patented IP –created and registered in
Greece- that generates an annual turnover of EUR €22 billion and a gross profit of EUR €2.4 b.
Additionally, the technology company paid 26% tax at the end of the previous year -which ended in
December 31, 2013- and this left a net profit of EUR €1.78 Billion. Although, the Greek Corporation tax has
remained 20% for 2011 and 2012, the ministry has already decided to raise tax in 26% for 2013 and 2014.
Obviously, this has increased the technology company’s tax and, thus, the company should apply some
legitimate methods that could significantly reduce its tax obligations.

The Tax Plan
The tax plan, that this paper suggests, is based on the geographical financial conditions as well as on the
other big multinational companies’ tax reduction models (Google, Facebook). Firstly, the technology
company must relocate its Greek headquarters to Cyprus (very common in Greece); in order to take
advantage of the 12.5% basic income tax rate (see Appendix 3). Furthermore, the company’s IP ownership
should be relocated to Bermuda7 due to its zero tax income rates (see Appendix 3).

6

When Pfizer acquired Pharmacia for $60 billion in 2003, the company booked $31 billion in acquired intellectual property (IP)
rights (Fischer and Gee, 2013).
7

Bermuda is a British Colony comprising a string of small islands no more than 15 miles long and 21 square miles in area.
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Since the patent will be developed in Bermuda and will be used in Cyprus, the taxable income will be
divided between the two countries using the residual profit-split method8, which is often the most
appropriate transfer pricing method when income is generated from the use of intangible assets (Markham
2004). As such, the amount charged for using the IP by its Bermuda Controlled Foreign Holding Company
(CFH) must be half of its gross profits, which means €1.2 billion.

Tax Plan Outcomes
According to the method chosen, the technology company’s tax will be reduced from EUR €0.62 billion
(Greek tax) to EUR €0.15 billion (Cyprus tax) on the €1.2 billion, plus zero tax (Bermuda) on the other €1.2
billion. Similarly, the net profit will be increased from EUR €1.78 billion to EUR €2.25 billion.
This method provides the resident country with a tax revenue of EUR €150 Million (Table 1) which –at 13%
of the technology company’s gross profit- is a fair amount and also provides the technology company’s
shareholder’s with a reasonable return on their investment.

Countries

Profit

Tax

Tax Amount

Net profit

Greece

€2.40 b

26%

€0.62 b

€1.78 b

Cyprus

€1.20 b

12,5%

€0.15 b

€1.05 b

Bermuda

€1.20 b

0%

€0.00 b

€1.20 b

€0.15 b

€2.25 b

Total
Table 1. The Tax plan outcomes

Analysis of the facts and issues
Legitimate Tax Plan
The objective of this paper is to provide a profitable, legitimate and ethical tax plan. Generally, it is globally
accepted that the companies’ major concern is to touch the highest level of profitability in order to be

8

The profit split method is used to evaluate controlled transactions to determine if the allocation of profits and losses between the
related parties were conducted at arm's length based on the relative value of their contributions to the profit or loss.
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economically powerful. However, alongside this effort, the organization must be compliant with all legal
rules and regulations; in every community where it has an active business presence (Waller et al, 2011).
Furthermore, following the CSR policy as described above in this paper, the organization should take
initiative for welfare of the society and should perform its activities within the frame work of environmental
norms.

Assumptions
The assumptions of the tax plan have taken into consideration the geographical common corporate practices
(Greece-Cyprus-Tax haven) as well as the basic functions of a Multinational Corporation Technology
company.

The Tax Plan
Investors and shareholders have become some of the most important allies of the CSR movement over the
years. While investors are influenced by an organization’s level of participation in CSR (Obiri, 2011), the
shareholders are considering social issues to ensure a morally appropriate use of their money (Glac, 2010).
Considering the fact that according to the proposed tax plan, the Multinational Corporation pays 13% of its
operating profit to its resident country (Cyprus), it is a positive CSR driven effect that investors may
appreciate. Thus, the tax plan fulfills all the requirements made by the stakeholders (shareholders, investors,
society) as the company reduces its tax obligations while considering the environment and, finally, increases
the added value of firm.

Conclusions
Companies look for ways to maximize shareholder value and as such, multinational companies are in
particular well-placed to exploit tax havens and ‘hide’ true profits thereby avoiding tax. However, most
multinational companies relocate only the IP ownership to tax havens such as Bermuda, Bahamas, Bahrain,
etc., and not the work that generates the business revenue, which remain in countries that are not tax havens.
As such, the paper propose a “fair” tax plan, where the multinational company relocates the IP ownership in
order to split the tax payable and to maximize profit, while in the same time it follows CSR policies.
www.thinkingfinance.info
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Consequently, as Waegenaere et al. (2010) found, the present value of income taxes collected by the
domestic government is weakly negative when production takes place in the foreign country.

Recommendations
There are two different views in how do people perceive the fact that multinational technology companies
avoid taxes using the tax havens opportunities. The ‘business’ people accept such practices as they can
easily understand the need of having a profitable company for the shareholders. Moreover, no one could
blame them that this practice is illegal as most of them are based on the existing laws. According to Forbes,
these companies aren’t doing anything illegal, but rather “gaming” the tax code system (Guglielmo, 2013).
On the other hand, the ‘simple’ people who pay all of their taxes perceive such practices as unethical.
According to the Guardian, tax avoidance has been branded by some as an immoral and unethical practice
that undermines the very integrity of the tax system (Foster, 2013).
A time has come to re-examine the provisions and settle these controversies so that there is more certainty
and fairness in the manner in which the law will be applied (Gupta, 2009). As such, the governments should
provide some clarity around what is tax avoidance, what is acceptable and what is not, so as to prevent tax
conflicts and define what is morally wrong.
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Appendices
Appendix 19 - Foreign investments of the main capitalist countries in millions of pounds sterling
Segment Results
The tables below present reportable segment results net of intersegment eliminations (in millions):
Americas

January 1, January 2,
%
2012
2011
Change

January 1, January 2,
2012
2011
As a % of Americas

Quarter Ended
total net revenues
Net revenues:
Company-operated stores
Licensed stores
Foodservice and other
Total net revenues
Cost of sales including occupancy costs
Store operating expenses
Other operating expenses
Depreciation and amortization expenses
General and administrative expenses
Total operating expenses
Operating income

$ 2,356.2 $ 2,148.0
216.4
173.8
6.0
6.1
2,578.6
2,327.9
1,006.7
874.8
20.5
97.1
16.3
2,015.4
$ 563.2

875.9
795.6
17.9
98.2
13.3
1,800.9
$ 527.0

9.7 % 91.4 % 92.3 %
24.5
8.4
7.5
(1.6 )
0.2
0.3
10.8
100.0
100.0
14.9
10.0
14.5
(1.1 )
22.6
11.9
6.9

39.0
33.9
0.8
3.8
0.6
78.2
% 21.8 %

37.6
34.2
0.8
4.2
0.6
77.4
22.6 %

Supplemental Ratios:
Store operating expenses as a percentage of company-operated stores revenue 37.1 % 37.0 %
January 1, January 2,
%
January 1, January 2,
EMEA
2012
2011
Change
2012
2011
As a % of EMEA
Quarter Ended
total net revenues
Net revenues:
Company-operated stores
$ 264.3 $ 225.2
17.4 % 87.2 % 86.9 %
Licensed stores
31.2
26.5
17.7
10.3
10.2
Foodservice
7.5
7.4
1.4
2.5
2.9
16.9
Total net revenues
303.0
259.1
100.0
100.0
Cost of sales including occupancy costs
Store operating expenses
Other operating expenses
Depreciation and amortization expenses
General and administrative expenses
Total operating expenses
9

150.4
93.8
8.6
14.2
16.5
283.5

122.7
76.8
8.1
12.2
16.4
236.2

22.6
22.1
6.2
16.4
0.6
20.0

49.6
31.0
2.8
4.7
5.4
93.6

Source: (Emmanuel, 1972)
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47.4
29.6
3.1
4.7
6.3
91.2

Income from equity investees
Operating income

(87.0 )
(21.4 ) %

0.1
6.5 %

0.9
9.7 %

Supplemental Ratios:
Store operating expenses as a percentage of company-operated stores revenue

35.5 %

34.1 %

$

0.3
19.8

$

2.3
25.2

Appendix 210 – Share of Projected World Estimates of GDP

Figure 1. Share of Projected Estimates of GDP
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Source: IMF, results reflect current/nominal values of Investment
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Appendix 311 – Share of Projected World Estimates of GDP

Figure 2. Corporate tax rates table
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Source: KPMG, Corporate tax rates table.
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